“Tell Mommy everything” is the invitation the mother extends to her distressed child. “I tell Mommy everything,” the little girl says, until she reaches the point where she no longer tells her everything; in fact, she will no longer tell her anything at all.
“To say it all” is an expression that stems from a command, mostly implicit. This command relies—whether one perceives it or not—on the function that Lacan calls the subject-supposed-to-know. It is precisely with regard to the function of subject-supposed-to-know that even a judge can order a witness to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In this case, it refers to truth understood as that which conforms to reality. Among other contexts in which we observe the “saying it all,” let us compare the direction of conscience, confession, and the direction of the treatment.
As for the direction of conscience, the very act of allowing oneself to be guided does not in itself entail an obligation to tell one’s spiritual director everything; moreover, as the conciliar texts note, [1] the spiritual director must be chosen freely. The point on which Lacan focuses his criticism—and the incompatibility with the direction of conscience—lies precisely in the difference in the object upon which the guidance is directed: unlike the direction of conscience, in which the faithful are guided, in the direction of the treatment the analyst “must not direct the patient. The direction of conscience, in the sense of the moral guidance a faithful Catholic might find it, is radically excluded here.” [2] In psychoanalysis, it is the treatment that is directed, not the patient.
In his text, Lacan specifies what this direction in psychoanalysis consists of. The direction of the treatment “consists, first of all, in getting the subject to apply the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis.” [3] Here we see the emergence of a determining factor, an inviolable rule, which had already been established in the functioning of the justice system—where, however, it concerned telling the whole truth, factual truth—an obligation that a witness must adhere to in a trial, on pain of being convicted of perjury. In the psychoanalytic experience, too, it is a matter of “saying it all” while adhering to that indispensable parameter that Freud calls the Grundregel—the fundamental rule—which he elaborates on in his 1913 essay, Zur Einleitung der Behandlung. [4] Without the patient’s willingness to adhere to this rule, there is no analysis.
Before delving into what the fundamental rule entails, let’s compare the approach of the direction of conscience with the sacrament of confession, where the requirement of “saying it all” is set against another criterion—one that is equally indispensable—without which the act of absolution inherent in the sacrament of penance is invalid. In confession, one must confess all those sins that moral theology calls mortal sins. In practice, these are the acts that transgress what we call the Ten Commandments, which are set forth in two books of the Bible [5] and promulgated “by something that announces itself in the following form: ‘I am what I am.’” [6] In short, a matter of confession is an act that violates one of the Ten Commandments. However, the act must be committed by a human being acting voluntarily and consciously.
The imperative to which one who adheres to the Freudian rule submits is, however, of an entirely different nature. Addressing the “Rat Man,” Freud explained that he had to say everything that came to mind, even if it was unpleasant, irrelevant, nonsensical, or absurd. This was the condition—which Freud asserted was the only one to which the treatment would bind him. The patient had to adhere to that rule so that what Freud calls Einfall—that is, that “fall,” that irruption— could take place within the subject; a phenomenon that is often mistakenly translated as “free association.” The Einfall—a term strangely similar to Umfall, meaning accident or misfortune—appears in Freudian texts well before the Grundregel, as it is present, even in its verbal form, as early as in the Traumdeutung. [7] And yet the Einfall is ineffective unless it is firmly and indispensably anchored to the Grundregel.
“Saying it all,” therefore, differs depending on the object in question in the two processes: a sin committed consciously by the penitent, and the signifying chain that operates unconsciously for the analysand. Furthermore, everything pertaining to feelings, emotions, and anxieties is similar in both processes. Although they may torment the penitent, they are neither the object of confession nor evidence of repentance. Although affects are taken into account in an analytical treatment, they are considered not as causes but only as effects of the signifying process on the subject.
What differs, however, is the purpose of the two processes, where the objective differs sharply. For the penitent, it is absolution for the sin committed; for the analysand, even if there is no forgiveness for one’s own actions, there is nevertheless the possibility of establishing a new alliance with the drive.
[1] Cf. Il Concilio Vaticano II, Documenti, Ed. Dehoniane, Bologna, 1965, num. marg. 748, 788.
[2] Lacan, J., “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power”, Ecrits, trans. B. Fink (London/New York: Norton, 2006), p. 490.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Cf. Freud, S., “On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis I)” (1913), SE, Vol. XII: p. 121-144.
[5] Cf. Exodus, 20, 1-17 and Deuteronomy, 5, 6-22.
[6] Lacan, J., The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. D. Porter (London/New York: Norton, 1992), p. 81.
[7] Cf. Freud, S., “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900), SE, Vol. IV-V.
Paul Κlee, Tableau mural, 192
